Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 43 | Issue 3

Article 13

1952

Communication between Judge and Jury as Cause
for a New Trial

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Communication between Judge and Jury as Cause for a New Trial, 43 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 350 (1952-1953)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
Prepared by students of Northwestern
University School of Law, under the
direction of student members of the
Law School's Legal Publication Board

Gordon Linkon, Editor
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN JUDGE AND JURY AS CAUSE
FOR A NEW TRIAL
Paramount among the procedural safeguards guaranteed the accused in
a state criminal trial are the limitations placed upon the conduct of the
officers of the court during the trial. All courts agree that certain communications between the judge and jury outside the presence of the defendant call

for a new trial. The question, then, becomes whether all such communications,
or only those which might be prejudicial to the defendant, should be classified
as reversible error, as a matter of policy or under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Illinois Supreme Court recently faced that problem in People v.
Tilley.' Here, the court denied a new trial, holding that the particular communication between the judge and jury outside the presence of the defendant
was not prejudicial. 2 Two justices dissented on the ground that as a matter
of policy, any communication whatever between the judge and jury, except
3
in open court with the defendant present, should be cause for a new trial.
The theory followed by the majority in the Tilley case was first expressed
in Illinois in People v. Brothers.4 There, the court denied a motion to set
aside the verdict because of a communication between the judge and jury,
and set forth the cardinal test in such situations to be whether the communication could possibly influence the jury in a manner prejudicial to the defendant.5 In situations where the jury is clearly influenced, the courts which
1. 411 I1. 433, 104 N.E. 2d 449 (1952), Cert. granted, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3338 (June 24,
1952). (The defendant's petition for certiorari assigned error under the due process clause
and the Bill of Rights of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.)
2. Tilley was found guilty of manslaughter. The case involved the death of a young
woman as a result of an abortion. Defendant did not testify at the trial, but he signed
a waiver stating that if it was proved he performed the abortion, then he agreed the
operation was not necessary to save the girl's life. After the jury had deliberated through
the night, the judge went to the jury room in the company of the bailiff and inquired
whether there was any hope of arriving at a verdict. Upon an inquiry by one of the
jurors, the judge told the jury to read their instructions and that any additional instructions would have to be given in presence of the attorneys and the defendant. Another
juror then referred to the waiver defendant had signed and inquired whether in that statement he admitted committing an abortion. The judge replied, "No. he specifically denies it."
A short time later, the jury returned its verdict of guilty.
3. Justices Bristow and Maxwell dissented.
Judge in a murder trial inadvertantly submitted
4. 347 Ill. 530, 180 N.E. 442 (1932).
an instruction concerning manslaughter. Upon receiving written communications from the
jury asking about the instruction, the judge realized his mistake, withdrew the instruction,
and returned the other instructions to the jury. Held, motion to set aside the verdict of
murder denied.
5. People v. Alcade, 24 Cal.2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); Collins v. State, 78 Ga. 87
(1886) ; People v. LaMunion, 64 Fuller (Mich.) 709, 31 N.W. 593 (1887) ; People v. Pickert,
26 Misc. 112, 56 N.Y. Supp. 1090 (1889) ; Cartwright v. State, 12 Lea Tenn.) 620 (1883) ;
Denison v. State, 201 Wis. 3, 229 N.W. 83 (1930). See also 39 Am. Jur., Appeal and
Error §1050; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1366; Annotations at 22 A.L.R.262 (1923); 34
A.L.R. 104 (1925); 62 A.L.R. 1468 (1929), (At least seventeen states have followed the
liberal view).

1952]

CAUSE FOR A NEW TRIAL

6
follow the prejudice test have not been reluctant to grant new trials. But
in the majority of situations, the evidence has indicated an absence of influence on the jury or prejudice against the defendant; and the courts have
denied motions for new trials on that basis. Thus the courts have refused
to grant new trials where the judge asked that he be notified if the jury
should agree ;7 where no additional information was given that was not in
the original charge ;8 where upon inquiry as to whether the jury could return a decision of life imprisonment "and not eligible for parole," and the
judge answered no ;9 where, questioned as to the form of verdict, the judge
answered, "guilty or not guilty";1O where the trial judge, when asked
the meaning of a word, told the juror that a reference to the dictionary might
throw some light on it;" where the jury asked whether a type of verdict
was permissible, and the judge replied that he would have to send for the
defendant in order to answer ;12 where the jury asked whether they could
3
write a recommendation for clemency and the judge replied that they could.'
In conflict with the prejudice rule as set forth in the Brothers case, a
number of jurisdictions follow a more strict rationale which requires a new
trial in the instance of any communication whatever between the judge and
14
jury, except that which takes place in open court with the defendant present.
The proponents of this view feel that the question should not be in terms
of the substance and effect of each particular communication, but, whether
any communication at all is proper. This rationale is followed in a substan15
tial number of states regardless of the innocence of the communication.
Prior to the Brothers case, Illinois had consistently followed the strict rule,

6. E.g., Lewis v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 172, 119 P.2d 91 (1941). (Judge asked jury its
numerical division; appellate court held that burden of proving conduct is not prejudicial
is on the state.) Rogers v. State, 118 Tex. Crim. Rep. 123, 38 S.W.2d 784 (1931).
(Judge entered jury room and asked how they stood numerically. Foreman replied, "Four
to two," whereupon Judge commented that two were "awfully contrary." Held, new trial.)
The fact that these cases are rare would seem to indicate that either the trial judges are
properly exercising their impartial function or that the appellate judges are failing to
properly exercise their functions on review.
7. Cartwright v. State, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 620 (1883).
8. People v. LaMunion, 64 Fuller (Mich.) 709, 31 N.W. 593 (1887).
9. People v. Alcade, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 Pac. 627 (1944).
10. People v. Moore, 50 Hun. (N.Y.) 356, 3 N.Y. Supp. 159 (1888).
11. Denison v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. Rep. 426, 93 S.W. 731 (1906)
12. Com. v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 123 Atl. 286 (1924).
13. State v. McGlade, 165 Kan. 463, 196 P.2d 173 (1948) ; State v. Evans, 90 Kan. 795,
136 Pac. 270 (1913) ; State v. Costales, 27 N.M. 121, 19 P.2d 189 (1933).
14. Sargent v. Roberts is the most frequently quoted case propounding this rule; "As
it is impossible, we think, to complain of the substance of the communication, the only
question is whether any communication at all is proper .... And we are all of opinion,...
that no communication whatever ought to take place between the judge and the jury after
the cause has been committed to them by the charge of the judge unless in open court,
and, where practicable, in the presence of the counsel in the cause." 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 337,
341 (1823).
15. Hinson v. State, 133 Ark. 1*49, 201 S.W. 811 (1918) ; O'Connor v. Guthrie & Jordan,
11 Iowa 80 (1860) ; Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 181 (orig. ed. 262) (1859) ; State v. Duvel,
4 N.J. Misc. 719, 134 Atl. 283 (1926), af'd 103 N.J. Law 715, 137 Atl. 71 8 (1927); State
v. Ashley, 121 S.C. 15, 113 S.E. 305, (1922) ; State v. Wroth, 15 Wash. 621 47 Pac106(1896).
There are instances where the innocence of the communication hardly seemed to warrant
reversal. Hobery v. Minn., 3 Minn. 181' (orig. ed. 262) (1859) (judge informed jury
that if they wanted any information on matters of law, they should come into court and
ask for it) ; State v. Wroth, 15 Wash. 621, 47 Pac. 106 (1896) (upon request of jury, judge
went to jury room and stood in the doorway, soon returning to inform counsel that jury
requested him to repeat an instruction).
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with but one exception. 1 6 Even assuming that what was said or done by the
judge while in the jury room did not influence the jury,17 the courts would
grant a new trial for the simple reason that such an interview did take
place.' 8 But the court rejected the rule on the ground that it would be
"idle" to disturb the verdict where no prejudice could have resulted. 19
The policy underlying the strict rule is to guarantee the defendant his right
to a public trial-the right to be present at every stage of the proceedings.2 0
It is argued that private communications, however harmless, may open the
door to abuses and destroy the confidence of the accused and of the public
in the fairness of the trial.21 The remarks of the judge may be insignificant,
but something about his manner and actions could indicate approval, disappointment or contempt, adversely affecting the defendant's cause.22 Furthermore, since the defendant is not present when the communication occurs,
it may be extremely difficult for him to establish
prejudice, particularly
23
because a juror may not impeach his own verdict.
On the other hand, the policy underlying the more liberal rule, requiring
a showing of prejudice, is to prevent repetitious litigation after defendant
has had a full and complete trial. It is argued that harmless errors and
procedural technicalities should not be grounds for new trials. As a practical
matter, it is often impossible to prevent a juror from communicating with a
trial judge, as when the judge enters the jury room for some purpose other
than to communicate with the jury,25 or when a juror approaches the judge
to ask permission to telephone or to report he is i]1.26 Thus, it would seem
that no matter which rule is followed, extraneous communications may continue to occur.
The defendant under the liberal rule can satisfy the burden of showing
prejudice by reference to the communication itself. Appellate courts have
not hesitated to reverse where the communication was capable of a construction prejudicial to his cause. It is admitted that the defendant would
have difficulty in proving prejudice that may have been caused by some
gesture or voice inflection. However, this type of problem is not likely to
16. Rafferty v. People, 72 I1. 37 (1874) (The court refused to set aside the verdict,
calling the communication a mere "irregularity.")
17. Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 23 Ill. 289 (orig. ed. 349) (1860) (This is the landmark
case in Illinois.) Although this case involved a civil action, no distinction appears to be
made by the courts on this ground. See Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, (1927),
and annotation at 84 A.L.R. 220 (1933).
18. E.g., People v. Beck, 305 I1. 593, 137 N.E. 454- (1922); City of Mound City v.
Mason, 262 Ill. 392, 104 N. E. 332 (1914); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Robbins, 159 Ill.
598; 43 N.E. 332 (1895).

19.

People v. Brothers, 347 Il1. 530, 180 N.E. 442 (1932).

20.

People v. Beck, 305 Ill. 593, 137 N.E. 454 (1922).

21.

Outlaw v. United States, 81 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1936).

22.
23.

People v. Tilley, 411 Il1. 473, 480, 104 N.E. 2d 449, 502 (1952)
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2349 (3d ed. 1940).

(dissenting opinion).

24. Former testimony of deceased or absent witnesses is generally admitted against the
accused so long as the right of cross-examination had been satisfied. 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §1398 (3d ed. 1940). But see Seidensticker, Illinois Post-Consiction Hearing
,lct, 1 DEPAUL L. Ray. 243 (1952). (Examples where new trials have been granted under
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearings Act, and the state has asked that the matter be stricken
because of inability to produce witnesses.)
25. Denison v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. Rep. 426, 93 S.W. 731 (1906) (judge entered jury
room to pick up a form).
26.

People v. Brothers, 347 Ill. 530, 549, 180 N.E. 442, 449 (1932).
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occur frequently.2 7 Therefore, it would seem that the liberal rule adequately
safeguards defendant's rights, and, at the same time, avoids the problems of
repetitious litigation in cases where he has already had a fair trial.
The constitutionality of the liberal rule will be determined by the United
States Supreme Court when it hears the T¢ltey case on certiorari. 28 Although
the Supreme Court has not been faced with an extraneous communications
problem of this nature before, 29 the lower federal courts have met it in
several cases and have adopted a rule which differs slightly from both the
strict and liberal views expressed above. The federal courts hold that communicatios between the court and jury constitute error if the defendant
was not present when the communication occurred, but if the record shows
affirmatively that the defendant was not prejudiced by the communication,
then the error does not require reversal.30 If the record shows the error but
does not disclose whether it was or was not prejudicial, it is presumed to
have been prejudicial.31
This rule seems to have developed "upon general constitutional grounds"
and as a variation of the strict rule followed in many states. 32 Even assuming
that the federal courts adopted their rule upon constitutional grounds alone,
it will not necessarily follow that the states will be denied the choice of
adopting a more liberal rule without violating the constitutional guarantees.
In the past, the Court has adopted a strict rule for its own procedure but
left the states free to adopt less strict measures in analogous situations,
of evidence illegally seized,3 4 and the
e.g., the right to counsel, 33 the admission
35
self-incrimination.
privilege against
The Supreme Court must decide in the Ti¢ley case whether the liberal rule
applied in a state court amounts to a denial of procedural due process under
the federal constitution. Although the Court has specifically held that many
of the specific safeguards guaranteed a defendant in a criminal trial in the
federal courts by the Bill of Rights36 have not been extended to the state
courts by the Fourteenth Amendment nevertheless certain procedures in
27. There are no discovered cases where such a claim has even been asserted. However,
it may well be said that the absence of cases may be in part accounted for by the absence
of proof.
28. Cert. granted, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3338 (June 24, 1952). (It comes as a surprise that
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in view of the long existence of the liberal rule in
many states.)

29. The Supreme Court has dealt with the problem in other connections. Shields v.
United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927) (additional written instructions) ; Brasfield v. United
States, 272 U.S. 448 (1926) (judge asked jury its numerical division); Filippon v. Albion
Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919) (additional written instructions). The judge in these
cases did not orally communicate with the jury in private.
30. Ray v. United States, 114 F. 2d 508 (8th Cir. 1940); Outlaw v. United States,
81 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d 805 (9th Cir.
1935) ; Little v. United States, 73 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1934)'; Dodge v. United States,
258 Fed. 300 (2d Cir. 1919).
31. Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1935); Little v. United
States, 73 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1934).

32. The cases speak of defendant's "rights" or "constitutional rights," but are not
specific as to the exact constitutional guarantee in question. However, in Fina v. United
States, 46 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1931) the court held specifically that the communication
involved (the court answered a question propounded by the jury in the defendant's absence)
violated defendant's right to be present at all stages of the trial and of the right to a
fair and impartial trial.
33. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
34. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
35. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
36. Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164 (1906); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

